Forum: Human Rights Council

Question of: Reacting to the growing threats, harassment, and killings of human rights defenders

Student Officer: Emil Schatz, Helen Former

Position: (Co-) chair

Contact: emil.schatz@gyra.hamburg.de

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Description of the Issue

A human rights defender is not necessarily a famous activist or the head of an international organisation; far more often, it is a lawyer taking on a case nobody else will touch, a journalist reporting on a local mine, an indigenous leader defending her community's land, or a teacher raising awareness about domestic violence in her town. The United Nations defines the term

broadly and deliberately so: anyone who works, individually or together with others, to peacefully promote or protect human rights counts as a defender, regardless of profession, nationality, or whether they belong to an organisation at all. What unites them is simply the choice to stand up for the rights of others, often at great personal cost. In 2025 alone, at least 358 human rights defenders were killed across 28 countries for doing exactly that, according to the Human Rights Defenders Memorial coordinated by Front Line Defenders, a toll that amounts to roughly one defender killed almost every day of the year.

Human rights defenders occupy an essential position within the international human rights system. They are usually the first to notice and document a violation, the first to support its victims, and often the only ones willing to challenge those responsible, whether a government, a corporation, or an armed group. As former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan observed shortly before the adoption of the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders in 1998, when the rights of defenders are attacked, the rights of everyone else become less secure as a result. This is precisely why their protection is not a narrow or specialised concern but a foundational one for this committee.

The threats defenders face take many forms, and killing is only the most extreme and irreversible of them. Far more defenders each year experience arbitrary arrest and detention, death threats, surveillance, or legal action brought against them specifically to exhaust their time and money, so-called Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, or SLAPPs. Increasingly, states are passing laws on counter-terrorism, national security, or so-called "foreign agents" that are, in practice, used to criminalise legitimate human rights work rather than to address any genuine security threat. Digital tools add a further layer of danger: defenders are tracked using commercial spyware, profiled through facial recognition and other biometric surveillance, and targeted with coordinated smear campaigns branding them as criminals, terrorists, or enemies of development, often to justify what follows.

What makes this crisis especially urgent today is the direction in which the trend is moving. According to the CIVICUS Monitor, civic space, meaning the conditions under which people can organise, speak, and assemble freely, is now under severe attack in 122 of 198 countries and territories worldwide, and only seven per cent of the global population lives in a country with genuinely open civic space. At the same time, deep cuts to international development aid have triggered a serious funding crisis for the organisations that protect defenders, with

surveyed protection groups reporting a combined loss of forty-five million US dollars in annual support in 2025 alone. Impunity compounds all of this: in several of the countries most affected, the overwhelming majority of attacks against defenders, including killings, are never properly investigated or prosecuted.

This is, therefore, not a problem confined to a handful of dangerous countries, but a global pattern involving states, non-state actors such as organised crime and paramilitary groups, and, increasingly, private businesses whose projects defenders oppose. We ask delegates to consider how the international community can genuinely strengthen the protection of, and accountability for attacks against, human rights defenders, while respecting the sovereignty of member states and recognising that defenders are not a threat to be managed, but allies whose work benefits society as a whole.

Definition of Key Terms

When defining a specific legal instrument, the source is stated in brackets. All other terms are explained in plain language to be clearer and avoid misunderstandings.

Civic space: The environment in which people can organise, speak out, and take part in public life, covering freedoms such as expression, peaceful assembly, and association. When governments restrict these freedoms through repressive laws, surveillance, or violence, civic space is said to be "narrowing", "obstructed", or, in the most severe cases, "closed".

Criminalization: The misuse of the legal system, such as vague national security, counter-terrorism, or defamation laws, to prosecute human rights defenders for their peaceful activities. It is a way of punishing defenders while giving the appearance of following the rule of law.

Enabling environment: A general term for the conditions, including laws, institutions, and public attitudes, that allow human rights defenders to carry out their work safely and without fear of reprisal. Creating such an environment is a core obligation states accepted under the 1998 Declaration.

Enforced disappearance: The secret abduction or imprisonment of a person by the state, or with the state's approval, followed by a refusal to acknowledge what happened to them or

where they are. It is considered one of the gravest human rights violations and has repeatedly been used against defenders and their families.

Human rights defender (HRD): Any person who, alone or with others, acts peacefully to promote or protect human rights. The term covers a very broad range of people, including lawyers, journalists, trade unionists, indigenous leaders, and ordinary community members, and does not depend on formal qualifications or membership of an organisation.

Impunity: A situation in which those responsible for attacks on human rights defenders, including killings, are never investigated, prosecuted, or punished. Widespread impunity is one of the strongest signals to future attackers that they can act without consequence.

Reprisals: Acts of retaliation, ranging from harassment to violence, taken against a person specifically because they cooperated with the United Nations or another human rights body, for example, by sharing information or testifying.

SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation): A lawsuit filed not to genuinely win in court, but to intimidate a defender, journalist, or organisation into silence by burying them in legal costs and stress. SLAPPs are increasingly used by powerful individuals, states, and companies alike.

Smear campaign: A coordinated effort, often spread through media or social media, to damage a defender's reputation by falsely portraying them as a criminal, a foreign agent, or a threat to national development, usually as a way to justify further action against them.

Spyware: Software that can secretly access a person's phone or computer, for example, to read messages, track location, or activate a camera or microphone, without the owner's knowledge. Commercial spyware has repeatedly been found installed on the devices of defenders, journalists, and lawyers.

Transnational repression: Actions taken by a state, or by actors working on its behalf, to silence, intimidate, or punish a defender who has fled abroad, showing that crossing a border does not always guarantee safety.

Woman human rights defender (WHRD): A woman who defends human rights, or any defender working specifically on women's rights. WHRDs frequently face risks in addition to

those faced by other defenders, including gender-based violence, sexualised smear campaigns, and threats directed at their families.

Model United Nations Vocabulary

Amendment: A suggested change to a resolution. During the debate, delegates can propose adding, removing, or rewording part of a resolution, and the room then votes on whether to accept the change.

Co-Submitter: A delegate who signs a resolution so that it is allowed to be debated. Signing only means "I think this is worth discussing," and does not mean the delegate actually agrees with it.

Delegate: A participant who represents a country or organisation and works with others to solve the issues on the agenda. If you are reading this as a participant, this is you.

Lobbying: The stage before formal debate, where delegates talk through their ideas, combine their draft resolutions into stronger ones, and gather enough co-submitters for a resolution to reach the floor. It can be thought of as the negotiation phase.

Main Submitter: The delegate who leads a resolution, presenting it to the room and giving the first speech in its favour. Unlike a co-submitter, the Main Submitter has to actually support it.

Operative Clause (OC): The "action" part of a resolution. These are the numbered clauses near the end that state what should actually be done about the problem.

Position Paper: A short document a delegate writes before the conference, setting out what their assigned country thinks about an issue and which solutions it would support.

Preambulatory Clause (PC): The "background" part of a resolution. These opening clauses describe the problem and point to relevant facts, past actions, or treaties before any solutions are proposed.

Resolution: The main document of an MUN debate. It is built from preambulatory clauses (which describe the problem) and operative clauses (which propose the solutions), and it is what delegates ultimately vote on.

Background Information

The international recognition of human rights defenders is younger than many other areas of human rights law. After roughly thirteen years of negotiation, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in 1998, on the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Commonly known simply as the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, it was adopted by consensus and was the first UN instrument to name and recognise defenders specifically. Although not legally binding in itself, the Declaration draws on rights that are legally binding elsewhere, including freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly, and its adoption by consensus represented a strong political commitment by states to its principles.

Two years later, in 2000, the then Commission on Human Rights, the predecessor to today's Human Rights Council, created a dedicated mechanism to follow up on the Declaration: the mandate of the Special Representative, later renamed Special Rapporteur, on the situation of human rights defenders. Hina Jilani of Pakistan was the first to hold the position, followed by Margaret Sekaggya of Uganda, Michel Forst of France, and, from 2020 to March 2026, Mary Lawlor of Ireland, the founder of Front Line Defenders. In March 2026, the Council appointed Andrea Bolaños Vargas of Colombia as the newest mandate holder. Successive mandate holders have used the position to publish annual reports, investigate individual cases, conduct country visits, and press governments to explain attacks on defenders under their jurisdiction.

Despite this institutional attention, the situation on the ground has continued to worsen rather than improve. According to Front Line Defenders and the HRD Memorial, the killing of human rights defenders has risen steadily over the past three years: at least 300 defenders were killed in 28 countries in 2023, 324 in 32 countries in 2024, and 358 in 28 countries in 2025, bringing the documented total over the last decade to nearly 3,000. The same countries recur at the top of the list year after year: Colombia has consistently reported by far the highest number of killings, 157 in 2024 and 165 in 2025, followed by Mexico, Palestine, Brazil, and Honduras. Defenders working on land, environmental, and indigenous peoples' rights are the single most targeted group globally, closely followed by LGBTIQ+ and women's rights defenders.

Killing, however, represents only the most visible tip of a much larger pattern of repression. Front Line Defenders documented nearly 4,000 individual violations against defenders in 2025 across 119 countries, the most common being arbitrary arrest or detention, death threats, other forms of harassment, and legal action, including a rising number of SLAPP lawsuits. Criminalisation has become particularly widespread: charges most often relate to defamation, national security, or terrorism, and a growing number of states have adopted "foreign agent" laws modelled on those first used in Russia, which allow authorities to brand independent organisations as instruments of foreign interference and subject them to onerous restrictions or closure.

The case of Berta Cáceres illustrates how these threats connect to one another in practice. Cáceres, a Honduran indigenous Lenca leader and co-founder of the organisation COPINH, spent years leading opposition to the Agua Zarca hydroelectric dam, receiving at least 33 documented threats for her work. She was assassinated in her home in March 2016. A Honduran court later found that the killing had been ordered by executives of DESA, the company building the dam, and convicted seven men of carrying it out in 2018, followed by the conviction of a former DESA manager as a co-perpetrator in 2021. Her case is now widely cited as a clear example of how corporate interests, organised violence, and, according to her family and international observers, insufficient state investigation can combine against a defender, and of how long, uncertain, and partial the path to justice can be even in a well-documented case.

Digital technology has reshaped this landscape further still. Defenders increasingly rely on digital tools to document abuses and organise, but the same technologies expose them to new dangers, including commercial spyware, biometric mass surveillance through facial recognition, and coordinated online harassment, doxxing, and gender-based abuse, particularly against women defenders. In April 2025, the Human Rights Council responded with resolution 58/23, led by Norway and adopted by consensus, which for the first time called on states to end the use of biometric mass surveillance and to stop transferring surveillance technology to actors unable to use it in line with international human rights law.

Two additional trends make this a genuinely global and urgent issue for the committee. First, civic space itself is contracting: the CIVICUS Monitor found civil society under severe attack in 122 of 198 countries and territories in 2025, with only seven per cent of the world's

population living under conditions rated as open. Second, the protection system that does exist is now under severe financial strain, following major cuts to international development aid; a 2025 survey by Front Line Defenders of sixty civil society organisations found a combined loss of forty-five million US dollars in annual direct protection funding. The combination of rising danger, shrinking legal space, and a shrinking budget for protection is precisely the gap this committee is being asked to address.

Major Countries and Organizations Involved

Primary Countries

Colombia: Colombia has recorded by far the highest number of killings of human rights defenders of any country for several years running, 157 in 2024 and 165 in 2025, most often social and community leaders, land rights defenders, and former combatants involved in the peace process. If you represent Colombia, you are speaking from the country most central to this debate, shaped by the presence of armed groups and organised crime in areas the state does not fully control.

Mexico: Mexico consistently reports the second-highest number of killings, driven largely by organised crime rather than the state itself. Mexico created a national Mechanism for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and Journalists, making it a useful example of a national protection scheme, though one widely criticised as underfunded and too slow to respond.

Honduras: The country where Berta Cáceres, one of the most internationally recognised murdered defenders, was killed in 2016. Honduras has since adopted a National Human Rights Defenders Protection Law, making it a relevant case study in both the risks defenders face and the limits of national legislation passed in response.

Russian Federation: Rather than featuring prominently in killing statistics, Russia is central to this debate because of its "foreign agent" legislation, a legal model that brands independent civil society organisations as instruments of foreign interference and has since been copied by several other states seeking to restrict defenders through law rather than direct violence.

Norway: Norway has led nearly every major Human Rights Council resolution on defenders since 2013, including the most recent resolution on digital threats in 2025. If you represent

Norway, you are arguing from a strong diplomatic tradition of championing defender protection at the multilateral level.

Secondary Countries

Brazil: A significant rise in killings of indigenous and land rights defenders, increasingly linked to organised vigilante groups acting on behalf of landowners and agribusiness interests.

El Salvador and Nicaragua: Two Central American examples of the use of states of emergency, mass arrests, and the prosecution of lawyers and civil society leaders to suppress dissent.

Palestine: A context in which the killing of human rights defenders and documenters, including dozens recorded in Gaza in 2025, is directly tied to the ongoing armed conflict.

Pakistan: The prosecution of Baloch human rights defenders under counter-terrorism laws illustrates how national security legislation can be used against defenders documenting rights violations in a specific region.

Sudan: Grassroots defender networks such as the Emergency Response Rooms have continued documenting abuses and delivering aid throughout an active armed conflict, at extreme personal risk, and have been awarded international recognition in 2025.

United States: A country whose 2025 cuts to international development assistance contributed directly to the funding crisis facing protection organisations worldwide, while its own civic space rating was downgraded in the same year.

NGOs and IGOs

The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR): your own committee's dedicated expert mechanism and its supporting UN office.

Front Line Defenders and the HRD Memorial: the organisation that coordinates the only comprehensive annual documentation of killings of defenders worldwide, and a key source for this report.

The International Service for Human Rights (ISHR) and CIVICUS: are NGOs tracking, respectively, the international legal framework for defenders and the state of civic space worldwide.

The European Union, through ProtectDefenders.eu: the most developed regional protection mechanism currently in existence, providing emergency relocation, grants, and legal support to defenders at risk.

Peace Brigades International: an organisation known for physically accompanying threatened defenders, an approach sometimes referred to as protective accompaniment.

Timeline of events

1998 The Declaration on Human Rights Defenders. The UN General Assembly adopts, by consensus, the Declaration recognising individuals and groups who defend human rights, the first UN instrument to do so by name.

2000 The Special Rapporteur's mandate is created. The Commission on Human Rights establishes the mandate on the situation of human rights defenders, with Hina Jilani as the first mandate holder.

2004 EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders. The Council of the European Union adopts guidelines instructing EU missions abroad to support and protect defenders, revised further in 2008.

2013 First dedicated Human Rights Council resolution. The Council adopts resolution 22/6, "Protecting human rights defenders", the same year the General Assembly adopts its first resolution focused specifically on women human rights defenders.

2016 Killing of Berta Cáceres. The Honduran indigenous and environmental defender is assassinated after opposing a hydroelectric dam; the killing is later shown to have been ordered by company executives.

2019 Environmental Defenders Resolution. The Council adopts resolution 40/11, its first resolution specifically recognising and protecting environmental human rights defenders.

2020 Mary Lawlor became Special Rapporteur. The Irish founder of Front Line Defenders takes up the mandate, serving until March 2026.

2024 EU Anti-SLAPP Directive. The European Union adopts a directive against strategic lawsuits used to silence journalists and defenders, a response shaped in part by the 2017 murder of Maltese journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia.

April 2025 Resolution 58/23. Led by Norway, the Council adopts a resolution on human rights defenders and new and emerging technologies, addressing biometric surveillance, spyware, and SLAPPs.

2025 A record year of killings and a funding crisis. Front Line Defenders documents at least 358 killings of defenders in 28 countries, while surveyed protection organisations report a combined loss of USD 45 million in annual funding following cuts to international aid.

March 2026 New mandate holder appointed. The Human Rights Council appoints Andrea Bolaños Vargas of Colombia as the new Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders.

Previous attempts to solve the issue

At the UN level, the main tools have been the 1998 Declaration, the Special Rapporteur mandate created in 2000, and a growing series of Human Rights Council resolutions, from resolution 22/6 in 2013, through resolution 31/32 in 2016 on defenders of economic, social and cultural rights, resolution 40/11 in 2019 on environmental defenders, to resolution 58/23 in 2025 on digital threats. Each resolution has expanded the scope of protection recognised by the international community, and the Special Rapporteur has published detailed reports and intervened in individual cases through urgent appeals to governments. The central weakness of this approach is that none of these instruments are legally binding; they carry political weight but cannot compel a state to act, and some states reject the legitimacy of the mandate altogether.

At the regional level, the European Union has built the most developed protection system currently in existence. Its Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, adopted in 2004 and revised in 2008, direct EU embassies worldwide to monitor trials, visit detained defenders, and advocate on their behalf, while ProtectDefenders.eu, operating since 2015, has provided emergency relocation, grants, and legal support to more than 85,000 individuals, including over 10,000 people from 113 countries in a single recent year. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has also played an important role, for example by granting

Berta Cáceres precautionary measures years before her killing. More recently, the Council of Europe issued a 2024 recommendation on SLAPPs, and the European Union adopted a binding Anti-SLAPP Directive the same year, though it applies only to cross-border cases and EU member states have until May 2026 to transpose it into national law.

At the national level, a number of states directly affected by violence against defenders have created dedicated protection mechanisms, including Colombia's National Protection Unit, Mexico's Mechanism for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and Journalists, and Honduras's National Human Rights Defenders Protection Law. These represent genuine institutional recognition of the problem, but are widely criticised by defenders themselves as underfunded, slow to respond, and often unable to match the resources of the organised crime groups or armed actors responsible for the greatest number of attacks. At the same time, a growing number of other states have moved in the opposite direction, adopting "foreign agent", national security, or counter-terrorism legislation that restricts rather than protects civil society.

Taken together, these efforts have produced a genuine, if incomplete, body of international norms and a handful of functioning regional and national mechanisms, yet none of it is legally binding at the global level, protection remains geographically uneven, and the resources available for it are currently shrinking even as the number of documented violations continues to rise. Closing that gap between recognition and effective protection is the task now before this committee.

Possible solutions

There is no single fix for this issue, and every measure involves trade-offs, usually between protecting defenders more effectively and respecting the sovereignty and differing legal traditions of member states. The following are directions delegates may wish to explore and combine.

Strengthening national protection mechanisms. Delegates could call for existing national mechanisms, such as those in Colombia, Mexico, and Honduras, to be better funded and made to respond faster, and could encourage other high-risk states to establish similar bodies. The difficulty lies in persuading states to commit sustained funding, and in ensuring such

mechanisms can actually operate against organised crime and armed groups rather than only against isolated individuals.

Global standards against SLAPPs. Building on the EU's 2024 Anti-SLAPP Directive, delegates could support the development of shared international standards allowing courts to dismiss abusive lawsuits early and to protect defendants from excessive damages. The challenge is agreeing on a common definition of a SLAPP across very different legal systems.

Limiting the misuse of national security and "foreign agent" laws. Delegates could call on states to review legislation used to criminalise defenders and to bring it into line with international human rights law. This is likely to face resistance from states that view such legislation as a matter of internal sovereignty.

Regulating surveillance technology. Building on resolution 58/23, delegates could push for stronger limits on the sale, transfer, and use of spyware and biometric mass surveillance against civil society. The tension here is that states often defend such technology as necessary for security and law enforcement.

Corporate accountability. Delegates might propose that companies operating in high-risk sectors, particularly extractives and agribusiness, be required to assess and address the risks their projects pose to defenders who oppose them, following the model raised by the Cáceres case. This would likely meet resistance from business interests and raises complex questions of jurisdiction.

Cross-border protection. Since some defenders face threats even after fleeing their country, delegates could support emergency visa schemes, relocation support, and protective accompaniment programmes modelled on Peace Brigades International's work. Such measures are resource-intensive and depend on the willingness of receiving states.

Sustainable funding for protection. Given the 2025 funding crisis, delegates could explore a pooled, multilateral fund for defender protection that is less exposed to sudden cuts by any single donor state. The obstacle is competing budget priorities and general donor fatigue.

Recognition and visibility. Public statements, awards, and international attention on individual cases raise the political cost of attacking a defender and are comparatively low-cost

tools available to any state. On their own, however, they provide no material protection and work best alongside the measures above.

The real task for the committee is to combine several of these approaches into a balanced package, one that genuinely reduces the danger faced by defenders while respecting the sovereignty and legal traditions of member states.

How to prepare as a delegate

Firstly, all delegates are obligated to write at least one draft resolution and a minimum of two, preferably three, position papers so that all topics of the forum are fully covered.

The deadline to send in the documents is 27.08.26. After the deadline, documents will not be corrected by Student Officers. By then, all delegates should have sent in their document; documents turned in later than that should not be included in decision-making when it comes to awards (as for that, it is important to see how much work the individual delegates put into preparation).

The best preparation is to understand your own country's position before the debate begins. Find out whether your country ranks among those with the highest numbers of killings or attacks against defenders, whether it has a national protection mechanism or, instead, restrictive laws affecting civil society, and how its rating on the CIVICUS Monitor has changed in recent years. From there, think about which other delegations share your view and which will oppose it, so you arrive ready to build alliances during lobbying.

The role of businesses and non-state actors

Although companies, criminal networks, and armed groups cannot sit in this committee, they are responsible for a very large share of the violence and pressure defenders face, so you should understand their role. Extractive and agribusiness companies have repeatedly been linked to violence against defenders opposing their projects, as in the case of DESA and the killing of Berta Cáceres. Organised crime and paramilitary-style groups, such as those documented in parts of Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil, are now responsible for a large share of killings, often operating with limited state capacity to stop them. Private surveillance and spyware companies supply the technology increasingly used to track and expose defenders.

Any workable resolution will need to consider how far states can be held responsible for regulating these actors within their own borders and beyond.

Questions delegates should consider during research

- Does my country have a national mechanism to protect human rights defenders, and how well does it actually function?
- Is my country among those most affected by killings and harassment of defenders, or is it home to companies, financial flows, or technology implicated in such violence elsewhere?
- What laws exist in my country regulating civil society, protest, or foreign funding, and could any of them be used to restrict legitimate human rights work?
- Does my government use, produce, or export surveillance technology, and would it accept limits on how such technology is used against civil society?
- Would my country support binding international standards for the protection of defenders, or prefer to keep the current, largely non-binding framework?
- How can international support reach local and grassroots defenders, rather than only prominent, internationally connected organisations?
- What responsibility should businesses carry when their operations put defenders who oppose them at risk, and who should enforce it?
- How can the international community respond to the recent funding crisis facing organisations that protect defenders?

UN resolutions

Core instruments

Declaration on Human Rights Defenders (1998), General Assembly resolution 53/144: The founding UN instrument recognising and defining human rights defenders and outlining states' duties towards them.

Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/61: Created the mandate of the Special Representative, later Special Rapporteur, on the situation of human rights defenders.

Key Human Rights Council resolutions

Resolution 22/6 (2013), "Protecting human rights defenders": The Council's first dedicated resolution on the general protection of defenders. https://undocs.org/A/HRC/RES/22/6

Resolution 31/32 (2016), on defenders addressing economic, social and cultural rights: Extended recognition to defenders working specifically on economic, social, and cultural rights. https://undocs.org/A/HRC/RES/31/32

Resolution 40/11 (2019), on environmental human rights defenders: The Council's first resolution recognising and protecting environmental human rights defenders specifically. https://undocs.org/A/HRC/RES/40/11

Resolution 43/16 (2020), mandate renewal: Renewed the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders for a further three years. https://undocs.org/A/HRC/RES/43/16

Resolution 58/23 (2025), on human rights defenders and new and emerging technologies: The most recent resolution in the series, addressing biometric surveillance, spyware, and SLAPPs in the digital age. https://undocs.org/A/HRC/RES/58/23

The two resolutions most directly useful to cite in debate are 22/6, which established the Council's dedicated focus on defenders, and 58/23, which represents its most recent and most technologically specific position.

Useful links

- UN Digital Library: resolution finder. The official search tool for every UN resolution and document. Type in a topic (for example, "human rights defenders") or a resolution number to read the full text.
- UN Official Document System (undocs.org). The fastest way to open a specific resolution: simply add its symbol to the address, for example undocs.org/A/HRC/RES/58/23.
- OHCHR: Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders. The mandate holder's own page, gathering annual reports, country visits, and the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders in one place.

- Front Line Defenders: Global Analysis. The annual report and the only comprehensive yearly documentation of killings of defenders worldwide, useful for country-specific statistics.
- YouTube search: "human rights defenders explained". A starting point for short explainer videos on who defenders are and why they are protected under international law.

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